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Abstract: We study a novel control problem in the context of network coordination games:
the individuation of the smallest set of players capable of driving the system, globally, from one
Nash equilibrium to another one. Our main contribution is the design of a randomized algorithm
based on a time-reversible Markov chain with provable convergence garantees.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In a binary (0´ 1) coordination game over a graph, where
initially all agents are in the Nash equilibrium 0, what is
the minimum number of agents that if forced to 1 will push
the system to converge to the Nash equilibrium of all 1’s
under a best response dynamics? This paper is devoted
to the analysis of this problem and to the design of an
algorithm for an efficient solution.
The problem considered can be framed in the more general
setting of studying minimal interventions strategies needed
to make a multi-agent system governed by agents’ myopic
utility maximization, to drive from a Nash equilibrium to
a desired another one. In game theory, typically, interven-
tions have been modeled as perturbations of the utility
functions (e.g. taxes and prices in economic models or
tolls in transportation systems). Here we instead take a
different viewpoint: that of individuating a subset of nodes
(hopefully small) that if suitably controlled will lead the
entire system to the desired configuration. The minimum
cardinality of this set can also be interpreted as a measure
of resilience of the system: the larger it is, the more difficult
is for an external shock to destabilize it.
The problem of determining the best set of nodes to
exert the most effective control in a networked system has
recently appeared in other contexts: for instance in Yildiz
et al. (2013) and Vassio et al. (2014) authors study the
problem of the optimal position of stubborn influencers in
linear opinion dynamics.
Binary coordination games have received a great atten-
tion in the recent years as one of the basic models
for games with strategic complementarities Jackson and
Zenou (2015). Its variegate applications include modeling
of social and economic behaviors like adopt a new technol-
ogy, participate in an event, provide a public good effort.
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This game is analyzed in detail in Morris (2000) where the
key concept of cohesiveness of a set of players is introduced
and then used in characterizing all NE’s. Moreover, the
question if an initial seed of influenced players (that
maintain action 1 in all circumstances) is capable of
propagating to the all network is addressed in the same
paper and an equivalent characterization of this spreading
phenomenon is also expressed in terms of cohesiveness.
This contagion phenomenon is exactly what we want
to analyze: subset of nodes from which propagation is
successful will be called sufficient control sets and our goal
is to find such sets of minimum possible cardinality.
The condition proposed in Morris (2000) is computation-
ally quite demanding and can not be used to directly solve
our optimization problem. Indeed, even to determine if a
single set is a sufficient control set, it requires a number
of check growing exponentially in the cardinality of the
complement of such set.
The complementary problem of understanding, given an
integer k, what is the maximum possible spreading of
the state 1, starting from an initial seed of k influenced
players, was studied in a seminal paper by Kempe et al.
(2003). While their problem and ours are related, they are
independent, in the sense that solving one does not provide
a solution of the other. Another point worth stressing is
that, in their setting, Kempe et al. (2003) consider agents
equipped with random independent activation thresholds
and take as functional to be optimized the average size of
the maximum spreading. They prove that such functional
is sub-modular and then they design a greedy algorithm
for obtaining suboptimal solutions. The randomness that
they introduce is actually crucial in their approach, as
the functional considered would not be sub-modular for
deterministic choices of thresholds.
In this paper we consider a scenario when all agents
have a fixed threshold 1{2, thus not covered in Kempe
et al. (2003), and we design an iterative search randomized
algorithm with provable properties of convergence towards
sufficient control sets of minimum cardinality. The core of
the algorithm is a time-reversible Markov chains over the
family of all sufficient control sets that starts with the
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full set, moves through all of them in an ergodic way, and
concentrates its mass on those of minimum cardinality .
We conclude this introduction with a brief outline of the
paper. In the final part of this section we report some
basic notation used throughout the paper. Section 2 is
dedicated to the formal introduction of the problem. The
main technical parts are Sections 3 and 4. In Section 3,
we introduce the important notion of monotone crusade
(appeared for other purposes in Drakopoulos et al. (2014,
2016)) and we give an equivalent (but more operative)
characterization of sufficient control sets. In Section 4 we
introduce a family of reversible Markov chains whose in-
variant probability is proven to concentrate on the optimal
sufficient control sets. Section 5 describes the algorithm,
based on the Markov chains introduced in the previous sec-
tion, and presents some simulation results. Finally, Section
6 ends the paper.
1.1 Notation
Vectors are indicated in bold-face letters x, y, z. For x, y
are two vectors of the same dimension, the notation x ď y
indicates that x is lower or equal component-wise than
y. We define as usual the binary vectors δi: pδiqi “ 1
and pδiqj “ 0 for every j ‰ i. If S Ď t1, . . . , nu, we
put 1S “ řiPS δi. Every x P t0, 1un can be written as
x “ 1S for some S Ď t1, . . . , nu. We call such a subset S
the support of x and we denote it Sx. We use the notation
0 and 1 to denote, respectively, the vector of all 0’s and
the vector of all 1’s of any possible dimension.
2. CONTROLLED MAJORITY DYNAMICS
We consider a set of players V “ t1, . . . , nu connected by
a simple undirected graph G “ pV, Eq (e.g. E Ď V ˆ V is
such that pi, iq R E for any i and pi, jq P E iff pj, iq P E).
The binary set A “ t0, 1u is the set of possible actions for
all players. We put X “ An and we define the majority
game on G as the game where each player i P V has utility
λci : X Ñ R given by
λci pxq “ |tj P Ni |xj “ xiu|
where Ni is the neighborhood of agent i in G. In other
words, λci pxq is the number of neighbors of i with which i
is in agreement.
As usual in game theory, given a configuration vector x P
X and a player i, we indicate with x´i the configuration
restricted to all players but i and we consequently write
x “ pxi,x´iq.
Best response sets are defined by
Bci pxq “ argmax
αPA
λci pα,x´iq
Using the notation
ni,apxq “ |tj P Ni |xj “ αu|, α “ 0, 1 (1)
to indicate the number of neighbors of an agent i playing
action α in the configuration x, Best response sets can be
more explicitly described as
Bci pxq “
# t0u, if ni,0pxq ą ni,1pxq
t0, 1u, if ni,0pxq “ ni,1pxq
t1u, if ni,0pxq ă ni,1pxq
N denotes the set of Nash equilibria: N “ tx P X |xi P
Bci pxq @i P Vu. This set depends on the topology of the
graph G, note however that 0 and 1 are always Nash
equilibria.
It is well known that this game is potential with a potential
Φc given by
Φcpxq “ |tpi, jq P E , |xj “ xiu| (2)
This simply says that, for every configuration x P X ,
action α P A and player i P V, it holds
Φcpα,x´iq ´ Φcpxq “ λci pα,x´iq ´ λci pxq (3)
The (asyncronous) best response dynamics is a discrete
time Markov chain (MC) Xt on the configuration space
X where, at every time t, a player i is chosen uniformly
at random and it modifies its action choosing an element
uniformly at random within Bci ppXtq´iq. Denote with Px,y
the transition matrix (on X ˆ X ) of the MC Xt and note
that, given x P X and y “ pα,x´iq, it holds that
Px,y ą 0 ô Φcpα,x´iq ě Φcpxq (4)
From the fact that the potential is not decreasing along
the trajectories of Xt, it follows the classical result that,
with probability 1, Xt converges in finite time to the set
N of Nash equilibria.
The question we pose is: what is the minimal number of
agents that if forced to 1 will ensure almost surely that
the best response dynamics reach the state 1.
Given a subset C Ď V, we indicate with XCt the Markov
chain where only the agents in VzC update their action
according to the best response rule defined above, while
agents in C maintain action 1. This new MC takes values
in the subset of configurations
X pCq “ tx P X |xi “ 1@i P Cu
This restricted game remains potential. This new dynam-
ics will converge too to its set of Nash equilibria N C “ NX
X pCq.
The following definition is the main object of study of this
paper.
Definition 1. (Sufficient control set). C is a sufficient con-
trol set if
@x0 P X pCq, PpDt : XCt “ 1, |XC0 “ x0q “ 1 (5)
A sufficient control set is minimal if none of its strict
subsets is a sufficient control set.
A sufficient control set is optimal if there exists no suffi-
cient control set of strictly smaller cardinality.
Our objective is to find optimal sufficient control sets.
To give a more intuitive idea of what control sets resemble,
here are a few illustrative examples.
3. MONOTONE CRUSADES AND VALID CONTROL
SETS
We now define the concept of monotone crusade, that will
play a crucial role in our theory.
They are particular sequences of states, starting from an
initial state, end at 1 and such that at every step, the
number of their component with value 1, without ever
Fig. 1. Example : on trees, the set of the leaves (in green)
is always a valid control set.In red you can see another
valid control set, of size 2, minimal for this particular
tree
Fig. 2. An example of a clique, the sets of size
P
k
2
T´ 1 are
exactly the minimal control sets
Fig. 3. If all node have degree at most 2, then choosing one
node per connected component gives a control set
decreasing the potential.
More formally:
Definition 2. (Adapted Monotone Crusade). Let C Ď V.
A monotone crusade from C is a sequence of vectors
xk P X , for k “ 0, . . . ,m such that
(1) x0 “ 1C , xm “ 1
(2) for every k “ 1, . . . ,m´ 1 there exists ik P VzC such
that xk`1 “ xk ` δik
Moreover, if given a function V : X Ñ R, it holds
3. V pxk`1q ě V pxkq for k “ 0, . . . , n´ 1
then the sequence xk is called a V -adapted monotone
crusade from C.
A few comments on the above definition:
Remark 3. All nodes i1, . . . , 1m appearing in (2) are nec-
essarily distinct otherwise the condition xk P t0, 1un
for all k would be violated. Indeed, we must have that
VzC “ ti1, . . . , 1mu and thus m “ |VzC|. This allows for a
monotone crusade from C to be equivalently characterized
by the sequence of nodes pikq, the induced order on the
nodes or by the sequence of increasing support sets pSkq
defined by Sk “ Sxk , for k “ 0, . . . ,m having the property
that S0 “ C and Sm “ V.
Remark 4. We can also define a decreasing version of the
monotone crusade where x0 “ 1, xm “ 1C and where. for
every k, xk`1 “ xk ´ δik . This will be called a decreasing
monotone crusade to C (V -adapted if property 3. holds
true).
Definition 5. (Valid control set). A set C is V -valid if
there exists a V -adapted monotonous crusade from C.
Main goal of the rest of this section is to show that the class
of Φc-valid control sets (we recall that Φc is the potential
of the majority game) coincides with the class of sufficient
control sets defined in (Definition 1).
The following property is instrumental to our results.
Lemma 6. (monotonicity of Coordination Game). For all
x,y P X and i P V, the following conditions hold:
(1) if x ď y and Φcp1,x´iq ě Φcpxq then Φcp1,y´iq ě
Φcpyq;
(2) if x ě y and Φcp0,x´iq ě Φcpxq then Φcp0,y´iq ě
Φcpyq.
Proof We only prove the first assertion, the second can
be obtained by exchanging the role of 0 and 1.
If yi “ 1, we have that p1,y´iq “ y and there is nothing
to prove. If xi “ 1, then the inequality x ď y ensure that
yi “ 1 and we are thus in the previous case.
We now consider the case when both xi and yi have value
0. Note that, if z is such that zi “ 0, the variation of the
potential when player i changes its action from 0 to 1 can
be expressed as
Φcp1, z´iq ´ Φcpzq “ ni,1pzq ´ ni,0pzq
where, we recall, ni,1pzq and ni,0pzq are the number of
neighbors of i whose action is, respectively, 1 and 0. As x ď
y, we have that ni,0pyq ď ni,0pxq and ni,1pyq ě ni,0pxq.
Hence,
Φcp1,y´iq ´ Φcpyq “ ni,1pyq ´ ni,0pyq
ě ni,1pxq ´ ni,0pxq “ Φcp1,x´iq ´ Φcpxq
This yields the thesis.
Proposition 7. (monotonicity for inclusion). A superset of
a Φc-valid control set is a Φc-valid control set.
Proof Assume that C is a Φc-valid control set and let
C1 Ě C. Let xk be a Φc-adapted monotone crusade from C
with associated sequence of points pikq for k “ 1, . . . ,m “
n´ |C| such that xk`1´xk “ δik for each k. Consider the
subsequence of points ik1 , ik2 , . . . , ikm1 that are in VzC1 and
put yh “ maxt1C1 ,xkhu. By construction, we have that
yh ě xkh`1´1 and thus, by Lemma 6 and the fact that xk
is a Φc-adapted monotone crusade from C, we have that
Φcpyhq ď Φcpyh`1q.
Remark 8. (full set). The full set is always a Φc-valid
control set
The following clarifies the connection between valid control
sets for the majority game and sufficient control sets
introduced in the previous section.
Theorem 9. A subset C Ď V is a sufficient control set iff it
is a Φc-valid control set.
Proof We first show that a sufficient control set is Φc-
valid. If C is a sufficient control set, there exists a sequence
of vectors y0, . . . ,yT P X pCq such that y0 “ 1C and
yT “ 1 that the best response dynamics follows with
positive probability. This is equivalent to saying, using
the definition of best response dynamics (see in particular
property (4)) , that
(1) yk`1 ´ yk “ ˘δik for all k “ 0, . . . , T ´ 1;
(2) Φcpy0q ď ¨ ¨ ¨ ď ΦcpyT q.
For every i R C, define
kpiq “ mintk “ 1, . . . , T | yk ´ yk´1 “ δiu
that is the first time when agent i change its action to 1 in
the sequence yt. Order now the agents in VzC as i1, . . . , im
in such a way that ki1 ă ki2 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă kim . Consider
the increasing monotone crusade xh associated with the
sequence of points pihq, namely,
xh “ 1C `
ÿ
h1ďh
δih
and notice that xh´1 ě ykpihq´1. Since Φcpykpihq´1q ď
Φcpykpihqq, it follows from Lemma 6 that Φcpxh´1q ď
Φcpxhq. This tells us that xh is a Φc-adapted monotone
crusade from C and, thus, C a Φc-valid control set.
We now show that a Φc-valid control set C is sufficient.
We fix any initial condition x0 P X pCq and we put C1 “ Sx0 .C1 is a superset of C and, on the basis of Proposition 7, C1
is also a Φc-valid control set. Let x
k be a corresponding
Φc-adapted monotone crusade from C1. By the properties
of adapted monotone crusades (properties 2. and 3. in
Definition 2) and the characterization (4) of the transition
matrix of the best response dynamics Xt, starting from
x0, the MC Xt will follow such a sequence with positive
probability. Thus, from any initial condition, Xt will reach
1 with positive probability. A standard result on MC then
yields the thesis.
4. MARKOV CHAINS AND BACKWARD SEARCH
ALGORITHMS
The characterization of sufficient control sets through the
concept of monotone crusades suggest the possibility that
such sets can be found starting from the configuration
1, iteratively replacing 1’s with 0’s in the attempt to
follow backwards a monotone crusade. To this aim we
now introduce a family of MC Zt on the binary spaceX , parameterized by  P r0, 1s that will be the core part of
our algorithms.
Transitions of Zt are described as follows:
At every discrete time, a node uniformly at random i is
activated. If its neighbors with current action 1 (ni,1) are
strictly less than its neighbors with current action 0 (ni,0),
it stays still. Otherwise, if its action is 1 it changes to 0
with probability 1, while if its action is 0, it changes to 1
with probability .
The only non zero non trivial transition probabilities of Zt
are the following. Given x P X ,
xi “ 1, ni,1pxq ě ni,0pxq ñ P x,p0,x´iq “ 1{n
xi “ 0, ni,1pxq ě ni,0pxq ñ P x,p1,x´iq “ {n (6)
In the case when  “ 0, only transitions from 1 to 0
are allowed. In this case, the MC has absorbing points.
The relation of these points with sufficient control sets is
studied in the next result.
We denote
Z “ tx P X | PpDt0 : Z0t0 “ x | Z00 “ 1q ą 0u
Z8 “ tx P X | PpDt0 : Z0t “ x@t ě t0 | Z00 “ 1q ą 0u
the sets of reachable and absorbing state of the chain Z0.
Theorem 10. The following facts hold:
(1) C is a sufficient control set iff 1C P Z;
(2) C is a minimal sufficient control set iff 1C P Z8;
Proof
(1): By definition, if x “ 1C P Z, there exists a sequence
of configuration vectors yk, for k “ 0, . . . ,m such that
y0 “ 1 and ym “ 1C satisfying the properties
(1) yk ´ yk`1 “ δik for all k “ 0, . . . ,m´ 1;
(2) Φcpy0q ě ¨ ¨ ¨ ě ΦcpyT q.
Then xk “ ym´k is a Φc-adapted monotone crusade from C
and this yields that C is a Φc-valid control set and thus also
a sufficient control set by virtue of Theorem 9. Inverting
this argument we prove the other implication.
(2): If C is a minimal sufficient control set, we know from
(1) that 1C P Z. If, by contradiction, 1C R Z8, then, from
x “ 1C , the MC Z0t could reach, in one step, a different
state x1 “ 1C1 with C1 Ĺ C. This contradicts minimality.
Theorem 10 allows to reformulate the optimization prob-
lem as follows:
min
xPZ ||x||1 (7)
where ||x||1 “ ři xi. Optimal sufficient control sets C are
those for which 1C solves (7).
The MC Z0t is naturally related to the minority game
whose definition we briefly recall thus: Given an undirected
graph G “ pV, Eq, we define the minority game on G
as the binary game where each player i P V has utility
λai : X Ñ R given by
λai pxq “ |tj P Ni |xj ‰ xiu|
that is simply the number of neighbors with which i is in
disagreement. We denote by Na the set of Nash equilibria
of the minority game. This game is potential with a
potential Φa that is just the opposite than the potential of
the majority game:
Φapxq “ ´Φcpxq (8)
The following property clarifies the relation of the minority
game with our problem.
Proposition 11. Na Ď Z: Nash equilibria of the minority
game are valid control sets.
Proof Let x P Na and let yk, for k “ 1, . . . ,m be any
decreasing monotone crusade from 1 to x. By construction,
x ď yk ď 1 for all k. Consider the sequence of nodes pikq
such that yk´1´yk “ δik . We have that xik “ 0 for every
k. For all k, since x is a Nash equilibrium then 0 is in
ik’s minority best response, thus Φapxq ě Φap1,x´iq, or
equivalently, Φcpxq ď Φcp1,x´iq. By Lemma 6, it follows
that Φcpykq ď Φcp1,yk´iq “ Φcpyk´1q. Therefore xh “
ym´h is a Φc-adapted monotone crusade from C “ Sx. By
virtue of Theorem 10, we have that x P Z.
We have the following simple but not obvious consequence.
Corollary 12. (existence). For any graph, there exist a
sufficient control set whose size is less or equal to half the
number of nodes.
Proof The minority game, being potential, admits at
least one Nash equilibrium x P Na. By symmetry x˜ “ 1´x
is also a Nash equilibrium. Proposition 11 tells us that they
are both sufficient control sets and one of the two has the
required size property.
Theorem 10 and Proposition 11 can not be improved
further as shown by the following examples.
In the following figures 4 and 5 we report two examples of
optimal sufficient control sets that are not Nash equilibria
of the minority game, while figure 6 is a counter example
to the assumption that Z8 elements are minimal.
Fig. 4. This set is a minimal control set for the inclusion,
yet the rightmost node is not in its best response,
making it not a Nash
Fig. 5. This set is optimal, but not Nash
Fig. 6. Two sufficient control sets on the same graph, both
in Z8 only the one on the right is minimal.
The above considerations imply that we can not directly
use the dynamics Z0t as our algorithm to find optimal
sufficient control sets as its absorbing state Z8 are not
even minimal in general. To overcome this difficulty we
will instead use the MC Zt with  ą 0. As we will see, the
presence of the transition in the opposite direction will
permit the algorithm to make a full search on the set Z
and not to remain stacked in non optimal configurations.
This is guaranteed by the following final result.
Theorem 13. Let  ą 0. The following facts hold:
(1) Zt is ergodic inside the set of states Z;
(2) Zt is time-reversible and its unique invariant proba-
bility is given by µpxq :“ K||x||1 where K ą 0 is the
normalization constant;
(3) For Ñ 0`, µ converges in law to a probability mea-
sure µ concentrated on the subset argminxPZ ||x||1.
Proof (1): We first show that Z is invariant by Zt . First
notice that the transitions that decrease the number of
0’s in Z are also possible in Z0. We thus only have to
check the invariance for the transitions that increase the
number of 1’s in Z. Fix x P Z, suppose that xi “ 0 and
put y “ p1,x´iq. If P x,y ą 0, it follows from (6) that
ni,1pxq ě ni,0pxq. Since x P Z, there exists a sequence
of configuration vectors xk, for k “ 0, . . . ,m such that
x0 “ 1 and xm “ 1C satisfying the properties
(1) xk ´ xk`1 “ δik for all k “ 0, . . . ,m´ 1;
(2) Φcpx0q ě ¨ ¨ ¨ ě ΦcpxT q.
There must exist k¯ such that ik¯ “ i. Consider now yh
defined by
yh “
"
xh forh ď k¯
xh`1 ` δi forh ą k¯
Notice that yT´1 “ y Using again Lemma 6, we have that
Φcpy0q ě ¨ ¨ ¨ ě ΦcpyT´1q so that y P Z.
Ergodicity follows now from the observation that Z verify
the following property: for all transition with non zero
probability, also the reversed transition has non zero
probability. If x,y P Z, by definition of Z, they are both
reachable by Z0 (and thus also by Z) starting from 1.
Therefore, with positive probability, under the MC Z it
is possible to move from x to 1 and then to y.
(2) We need to show that for all x, y P Z, it holds
||x||1P x,y “ ||y||1P y,x
Since the only non-trivial transitions of Z are those in
(6), we can reduce to check it in the case when, for some
i P V, xi “ 1 and y “ p0,x´iq. In this case we obtain that
||x||1P x,y “ 
||x}1
n
, ||y||1P y,x “ ||x||1´1 n “
||x||1
n
This proves the claim.
(3) follows from the expression of µ.
By virtue of the reformulation (7), we have that, for small
 and sufficiently large t, the MC Zt will be ’most of
the time’ in configurations whose support are optimal
sufficient control sets. Thsi observation is at the base of
a practical algorithm described in the next section.
5. SIMULATIONS
We have implemented an iterative algorithm based on
the MC Zt . For the sake of increasing the speed to
convergence, we actually considered a modification of Zt
with all trivial self-loop transitions removed. This induces
a little modification in the invariant probability, but do not
affect the minimal set that is the return of the algorithm.
Details will be reported elsewhere. The algorithm keeps
track of the best configuration (the smallest ||x||1) found
so far.
We have applied the algorithm to random realizations
of Erdo¨s-Re´niy graphs with different number of nodes n
and probability p “ 1{2. For every value of n, we ran
500 executions on 20 randomly generated graphs. The
algorithm is stopped after 100n iterations, using for epsilon
the constant value  “ 0.2.
As a point of comparison, we computed a benchmark
optimum consisting of the exhaustive optimum for small
graphs, and a much longer execution on bigger graphs.
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Fig. 7. In blue, the benchmark optimum. In purple, the
minimal control set encountered in 100n steps. In
green, the size of the control set at the end.
Figure 7 shows the average values of the size of the
sufficient control sets computed by the algorithm. We
compare it with the benchmark optimum and also with
the result obtained looking at the very last step of the
algorithm. This plot shows a remarkable performance of
the algorithm that in linear time gets quite close to the
optimum. It also shows that the MC, though fluctuating,
as  ą 0, still remains close to the optimal configurations.
The important question of how to tune the parameter 
for optimize performance has not been addressed here.
Finally notice how optimal sufficient control sets are
scaling linearly with respect to the size of the graph. This
suggests that Erdo¨s-Re´niy graphs are somewhat ’difficult’
to control in this sense, in other terms they show resilience
to this type of external actions.
6. CONCLUSION
We have formulated the problem of finding, in a network
coordination game, the minimum number of players to be
controlled in order to drive the system from one Nash
equilibrium to another one. To the scope, we have designed
a low complexity randomized algorithm and proven its
convergence properties. We have finally carried on some
numerical simulations corroborating the results.
Many challenging issues naturally pop up from our anal-
ysis and simulations. Erdo¨s-Re´niy graphs have exhibited
optimal sufficient control sets growing linearly in the size
of the graph. It would be of interest if this could be proven
analytically, as well if this could be extended to other
family of graphs, connecting such resilient phenomena to
topological properties.
The problem studied in this paper is an instance of a more
general problem of studying the effect of control actions in
evolutionary game theory. Future research will be in this
direction analyzing similar control problems for general
games with strategic complementarity as well strategic
substitutes.
REFERENCES
Drakopoulos, K., Ozdaglar, A., and Tsitsiklis, J.N. (2014).
An efficient curing policy for epidemics on graphs. IEEE
Transactions on Network Science and Engineering, 1(2),
67–75.
Drakopoulos, K., Ozdaglar, A., and Tsitsiklis, J.N. (2016).
When is a network epidemic hard to eliminate? Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 42(1-14).
Jackson, M. and Zenou, Y. (2015). Games on networks.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
Kempe, D., Kleinberg, J., and Tardos, E. (2003). Maxi-
mizing the spread of influence through a social network.
In A.N. York (ed.), KDD ’03 Proceedings of the ninth
ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge
discovery and data mining, 137–146.
Morris, S. (2000). Contagion. The Review of Economic
Studies.
Vassio, L., Fagnani, F., Frasca, P., and Ozdaglar, A.
(2014). Message passing optimization of harmonic
influence centrality. IEEE Transactions on Control of
Network Systems, 1(1), 109–120.
Yildiz, E., Ozdaglar, A., Acemoglu, D., Saberi, A., and
Scaglione, A. (2013). Binary opinion dynamics with
stubborn agents. ACM Transactions on Economics and
Computation, 1(4), 19–30.
